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Lies, Damned Lies, and Judicial Empathy
Mary Anne Franks*
In the wake of Justice Souter's 2009 announcement that he was retiring
from the Supreme Court,' President Barack Obama made statements extolling
the value of judicial empathy, sparking a national debate about how judges
should make their decisions. 2 What had the potential to become a productive
discussion about the role empathy should play in our moral imagination and
in our courts quickly devolved into a pitched battle between two caricatures:
the activist judge who decides cases based on his feelings and political agenda
and the impartial judge who dispassionately applies the rules of law. The
supposed contrast was only heightened by the visuals of the Supreme Court
confirmation hearings that followed President Obama's first nomination:
future Justice Sotomayor didn't just stand out because of her "wise Latina"
comments; 3 she stood out because she looked so different, not just from her
primarily male, primarily white interrogators on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, but also from so many of the nominees who preceded her. The
image of Sotomayor fending off accusations of bias provided an intriguing
visual contrast to Chief Justice Roberts in the same seat a few years prior,
calmly expounding on his theory that judges are mere "umpires" who "don't
make the rules, they apply them.' The principal characters of the empathy
soap opera were cast in the weeks and months following President Obama's
remarks: President Obama himself, Sotomayor, and President Obama's next
Supreme Court nominee, Elena Kagan (liberal, racial and/or gender minorities
associated with the concept of empathy) on one side, Chief Justice Roberts,
Senator Orrin Hatch, and Senator Jeff Sessions (conservative white men
associated with judicial impartiality) on the other. Were the race and gender
of the characters merely a coincidence, or did they have something to do with
the way the battle over empathy took such a misguided turn? Because turn it
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter's Exit to Give Obama First Opening, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/02souter.html.
2. See, e.g., Obama's Remarks on the Resignation ofJustice Souter, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/politics/01souter.text.html [hereinafter Obama s Remarks].
3. See Charlie Savage, A Judge's View ofJudging Is on the Record, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.con/2009/05/15/us/I 5judge.html.
4. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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did: within days, judicial empathy and judicial impartiality were presented as
polar opposites, with the former associated with progressives and the latter
with conservatives. 5 This narrative about empathy and impartiality has kept
its grip on the national discourse despite the fact that it is, to put it plainly, a
lie.
First, it is simply not the case that empathy and impartiality are mutually
exclusive either in definition or application. To claim this is to misconstrue
both terms. The supposed opposition between empathy and impartiality only
succeeds by being mapped on to the supposed divide between progressives
and conservatives. Conservatives seized on the word empathy because they
saw an opportunity to impose a label that made progressives look biased-not
a new technique, by any means. And they seized on the image of impartiality
for themselves because it made conservatives look neutral-also not a new
technique.6 Empathy is not, as many scholars have pointed out, an intuitive
concept or one with clearly defined contours.7 It sounds vague and indistinct
and dangerously open-and thus is an ideal term for discrediting a group.
Given that empathy has, perhaps unfortunately, taken such a prominent role in
our national conversation about judging, it is worth trying to develop a more
precise working definition of judicial empathy, which I will attempt to do
later in this Essay.
But the necessarily prior and more important task, in my view, is to
attack the truly shameless aspect of the empathy wars: the conservative claim
to empathy's supposed opposite, impartiality. This is the foundation on which
the other, smaller lies are told, and as such must be addressed before any new
working definition of empathy can be advocated or indeed genuinely heard.
As Susan Bandes writes, the exaltation of impartiality and the denigration of
empathy flies in the face of judicial reality, and is the product of "deep
anxiety about the power of judges."8 Though it has been said many times
before, it needs to be said again: the judiciary, broadly speaking, and indeed
the law itself, is rife with bias.9 It reflects the interests and prejudices of the
powerful and those who most resemble the powerful. This should come as no
surprise, given that through the greater part of our history, the process of
writing, executing, and interpreting our laws explicitly excluded women and
African Americans, and implicitly excluded other minorities and the poor.
5. See Charlie Savage, Scouring Obama 's Past for Clues on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/us/politics/10court.html (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch as calling "empathy
a 'code' for liberal activism, in contrast to ajudge who is impartially 'fair to the rich, the poor, the weak, the
strong' alike").
6. See, e.g., Fox NEws, http://www.foxnews.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (displaying the
network's "Fair & Balanced" slogan).
7. See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 6-7 (2011).
8. Id. at 7.
9. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629 (2011).
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Though our law is evolving, it will be some time before the impact of a racist,
sexist, and classist legal edifice can truly be undone. That edifice has
impoverished the moral imagination of society as a whole, and its effects on
the judicial moral imagination are a particular cause for concern.
This recognition does not require fatalism. It does not mean that the law
itself and the judicial system are rotten to the core. At the heart of the
American legal system, in the U.S. Constitution, are noble and enduring
structures within which a just legal system can develop. But this possibility is
contingent upon the recognition of the law's historic and continuing biases.
To speak of the law or of the judiciary as impartial in a descriptive, as
opposed to an aspirational, way is to lie. It is a very effective lie for the
defenders of the status quo, because it makes the status quo seem both natural
and right. And if the status quo is natural and right, any attempt to change it
will be viewed as unnatural and wrong. This is precisely what has happened
in the debate over judicial empathy. If one recognizes, on the other hand, that
the status quo is itself biased and partial, then promoting a quality of open-
mindedness, of diversifying the moral imagination, may not be dismissed out
of hand. Moreover, such a quality can be more sharply defined, and thus
more usefully deployed, once we have a realistic picture of the judicial
landscape.
I. THE LIE THAT WON'T DIE:
THE CONSERVATIVE-IMPARTIAL-UNIVERSAL CLUSTER
With regard to judicial values, as with many issues, President Obama
seems to follow an "accentuate the positive eliminate the negative" approach.
President Obama tends to speak in terms of idealism and ambition, delicately
avoiding criticism of the status quo, assuming (hoping?) that his audience will
appreciate what is not being said. This approach has done him no favors
either with the political right or the public. President Obama tried to propose
empathy as a corrective to the judiciary without first making clear why the
judiciary might be in need of a corrective.
Let us imagine that President Obama, while a U.S. Senator faced with
future Chief Justice Roberts's insouciant characterization of judges as umpires
who merely apply rules,t 0 responded not with an encomium to the virtues of
broad perspectives and deep values but rather with an outright repudiation of
Roberts's claim. Let us imagine that he had said something along the lines of:
It is assuredly right that judges should aspire to apply the law fairly and without
respect to the prestige, power, or influence of persons. But it would be a
malicious and blatant lie to assert that this is what the judiciary in fact does
consistently. Rather, judges, like most people, are driven by prejudice, bias, and
10. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 55.
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self-interest. The greatest danger to justice is not that judges should be so
imperfect, but that they should not recognize their imperfections and strive to
correct them. It is precisely because of his casual assertion that judges are
objective, as opposed to the conviction that judges should strive to be objective,
that makes me unable to vote for the confirmation of John Roberts as a Supreme
Court Justice.
If this critique had laid the foundation for President Obama's judicial
philosophy, perhaps the public could have been spared Senator Sessions's
rehash of Chief Justice Roberts's facile "judges-as-umpires" metaphor when
describing the virtues of Supreme Court nominees: "The core strength of
American law is that a judge puts on that robe and he says, 'I am unbiased;
I'm going to call the balls and strikes based on where the pitch is placed, not
on whose side I'm on. I don't take sides in the game.' "ll Perhaps we would
never have had to hear another declaration (as opposed to demonstration) of
judicial impartiality even as courts disregarded women's rights over their own
bodies,12 presumed that innocent people never run from police,13 or
maintained that biological fathers have no rights to a relationship with
children they love and support if the children's mother is married to someone
else. 14 Even if one were to believe that judges can and do simply apply the
rules of law, it would be necessary to point out that in many cases, the law
itself takes sides. The law is a product of the biases, assumptions, and self-
interest of those who write it, enforce it, and uphold it. One hopes that the
law is much more than this, but it must be recognized that this is its
foundation. To refuse to recognize that the law is itself marked by bias is to
naturalize those biases and insulate them from critique or correction.
Consider, as one example, the law's continuing sympathy toward men
who kill their intimate partners or ex-partners out of jealousy or anger at
separation in the form of provocation defenses.15 Contrast this to the struggle
to even allow evidence of Battered Women's Syndrome to be admitted in
cases where women have killed their partners or ex-partners after years of
abuse, 16 to say nothing of the harshness with which such women are treated
compared to men who kill out of jealousy or anger. The law clearly takes
sides with men's interests over women's in much of the law on domestic
violence, as well as laws regarding sexual assault, reproduction, and
i1. Sessions Says He's Looking for Judicial Restraint, NATIONAL JOURNAL (May 7, 2009),
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njonline/sessions-says-he-s-looking-for-judicial-restraint-20090507.
12. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
13. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,647 (1991).
14. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUDIEs 71, 72 (1992); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991); Laurie J. Taylor, Comment, Provoked
Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1679, 1682 (1986).
16. See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331, 1334, 1355 (1997).
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harassment. To be clear, it is not the fact that the law is biased in this way
that is the real danger. The real cause for concern is when the law that
includes such shameless partiality is called, with a straight face, "objective" or
"impartial." The claim of legal impartiality demonstrates just how
successfully the interests of some have been coded as the interests of all.
When the particular is coded as the universal, it is immunized from attack.
Those who would criticize or reform it are dismissed as "biased."
If the lie of the impartial judiciary is believed, introducing a quality such
as empathy will seem like a dangerous and unnecessary add-on. President
Obama missed the opportunity to lay claim to the real terms of the debate,
namely, that those who insist that the judicial status quo is objective are
delusional at best and liars at worst. President Obama's decision to open with
a call for judicial empathy played directly into the hands of the right, which
has mastered the art of professed neutrality. The other clich6d divisions line
up from there: the right is rational, the left is emotional; the right is impartial,
the left is biased; the right acts on behalf of the universal, the left on behalf of
favoritism. President Obama, and progressives generally, constantly fall into
the trap of defending the territory of emotion and uncertainty. In our political
setting, where false binaries between emotion and reason dominate, being on
the side of emotion is a costly thing. The left should not let itself be aligned
with the right's caricature of emotion and bias, and should not concede the
high ground of aspirationally impartial judging.
Does this mean President Obama should never have spoken of empathy?
No. But he should have done so only after explicitly describing the rampant
self-interest that defines so much of our society, our politics, and our law.
Only then does it become clear what role empathy can play and how it should
be separated from mere emotion or sympathy. Once we diagnose the
judiciary as suffering from an overabundance of self-interest-which it
refuses to recognize as self-interest-then we can see that the proper
treatment must target the process whereby particular interests are coded as
universal interests. This is the move from the descriptive to the aspirational in
judging-we are all subject to the influence of self-interest, but in judging we
must consciously attempt to recognize and evaluate that self-interest. One
way of doing the latter is through empathy.
II. THE PARTISAN (MliS)TRANSLATION OF EMPATHY
As we saw, however, President Obama did not begin the conversation on
judicial values with a critique of the status quo. He began instead by praising
empathy as an admirable characteristic in a Supreme Court Justice: "I view
that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with people's hopes
2011] 65
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and struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions and
outcomes." 1 7  The way the political right translated this statement was
depressingly predictable. President Obama of course did not say, or even
suggest, that judges should "go on feeling" or "side with the little guy." It
would have been surprising if he had, given that such a definition of empathy
would indicate that President Obama is either stupid or remarkably
unsophisticated (and even his detractors would have a hard time making that
claim). Nor did he indicate that empathy was outcome-determinative: as he
went on to say, "I will seek somebody who is dedicated to the rule of law,
who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the integrity of the
judicial process and the appropriate limits of the judicial role."' 8  On their
face, President Obama's statements were fairly straightforward-nothing he
said regarding judicial values was mysterious or unintelligible. President
Obama could have provided more clarity or precision as to just how empathy
should be defined and deployed in judging, of course, but no political figures
were particularly interested in asking him.
Instead, conservative members of Congress took to the media to
"translate" President Obama's words for the (ignorant?) people. Senator
Hatch claimed that when President Obama uses it, empathy is "[u]sually . .. a
code word for an activist judge."' 9 President Obama "said he favored judges
who have an appreciation for 'how our laws affect the daily realities of
people's lives,' but what he really meant was that he would select judges
based not on merit but 'on the basis of their personal politics, their personal
feelings, their personal preferences.' "20 Senator Sessions, when asked about
President Obama's empathy standard, acknowledged the rather obvious point
that President Obama had said things in his remarks on Justice Souter's
replacement that indicated the "classical independence of the judiciary, and
that [judges] should follow the Constitution." 21 And yet Senator Sessions
insisted:
I don't know what he means [by empathy]. And it's dangerous, because I don't
know what empathy means. So I'm one judge and I have empathy for you and
not this party, and so I'm going to rule for the one I have empathy with? So
what if the guy doesn't like your haircut, or for some reason doesn't like you, is
he now free to rule one way or the other based on likes, predilections, politics,
personal values?22
Empathy was transformed into a synonym for arbitrariness and caprice.
17. Obama's Remarks, supra note 2.
18. Id
19. 'This Week' Transcript: Sens. Leahy and Hatch, ABC NEWS (May 3, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com
/ThisWeek/story?id=7491153&page=1.
20. John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of President Obama 's "Empathy
Standard, " 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 91 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/13/rollert.html.
21. Sessions Says He's Looking For Judicial Restraint, supra note 11.
22. Id.
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Can some motivation other than pure partisan gamesmanship account for
the Republicans' rush to decode President Obama's "empathy-as-judicial-
value" as "empathy-as-outcome-determinative bias"? Is it possible that this
was simply a case of honest misunderstanding? President Obama could have
been more precise about how empathy works as a mechanism in the judicial
process, certainly, a point that will be addressed below. But compare the
Republican response to Obama's statements with the response, Republican or
otherwise, to President George H.W. Bush's announcement of Clarence
Thomas as his Supreme Court nominee. President Bush stated, "He is a
delightful and warm, intelligent person who has great empathy and a
wonderful sense of humor. He's also a fiercely independent thinker with an
excellent legal mind, who believes passionately in equal opportunity for all
Americans."23 To the extent that President Bush offered some illuminating
limit to the concept of empathy in his remarks, it was remarkably similar to
President Obama's: "[Thomas] will approach the cases that come before the
Court with a commitment to deciding them fairly, as the facts and the law
require." 24  Yet politicians and pundits didn't go rushing to the media to
denounce President Bush's coded announcement ofjudicial activism and bias.
Many scholars and commentators have pointed out the way President
Obama's critics take a Humpty Dumpty approach25 to the word empathy.26
This Essay is more concerned with the highly selective motivation for why
they do so, and why the sloppy and often nonsensical definitions of empathy
these critics promote continue to exert such influence. The influence is so
strong that future Justice Sotomayor found herself battling the specter of
empathy at numerous turns during her confirmation hearings, finally
distancing herself from President Obama by rejecting the idea that a judge
should rely on his "heart" to decide certain cases. 27 Even more tellingly, the
abuse of the definition of empathy seems to have prompted President Obama
himself to stop using the word. In a statement following the announcement of
Justice Stevens's retirement, President Obama said his next nominee should
be someone with "'a fierce dedication to the rule of law and a keen
understanding of how the law affects the daily lives of the American
23. Media Obsess Over Obama's Comments, Ignore Bush's Highlighting of Thomas' "Great
Empathy," MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (May 26, 2009), http://mediamatters.org/research/200905260034.
24. Id. Compare to President Obama's statement that he "will seek somebody who is dedicated to the
rule of law, who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the integrity of the judicial process and the
appropriate limits of thejudicial role." Obama's Remarks, supra note 2.
25. "'When l use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose
it to mean-neither more nor less.'" LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 124 (1875).
26. See, e.g., Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, supra note 7, 4; Rollert, supra note 20, at 91-92;
Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1629, 1631 (2010); Chris Weigant, Is The Media Misinterpreting Obama s "Empathy" Dog Whistle?,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2009, 2:14 a.m.), http://www.huffington post.com/chris-weigant/is-the-media-
misinterpretb_198389.html.




people.' "28 But neither Justice Sotomayor's nor President Obama's efforts to
distance themselves from the word empathy have done much to appease their
critics. Regarding President Obama's shift from "empathy" to "life
experience," Senator Sessions remarked, " 'I'm not sure it's much
different.. . . It seems to be calling again for judges to be less committed to
fidelity to the law and calling for them to reach decisions that somehow
endeavor to decide who ought to win.' "29 In other words, no matter what
word or expression President Obama uses to describe what he values in
judicial appointees, the political right will interpret it as bias.
President Obama's statements on empathy were not stupid, nor were
they, on their face, particularly alarming. They did, however, seem to
presume an audience that would listen in good faith and with an
understanding of the flaws of the status quo. He was wrong. The right has
managed to turn "empathy" into a dirty word, and no manner of reasonable
restatement is likely to undo that. Perhaps this would be no great loss if the
effect were limited to a demographic concerned only with talking to itself, but
unfortunately partisan controversy often sets the tone and the shape of public
debate more broadly.
III. EMPATHY REVISITED
Is it worth it, then, to try to salvage empathy? Empathy, however
defined, is surely not the only, or even the key, characteristic of good judging.
Good judging is a complex and context-sensitive practice, and there is likely
no need to make empathy into a judicial meta-value, especially given the
controversy over its definition. But there is value to the concept for those
genuinely invested in thinking critically about the judicial process, and so I
offer some thoughts here about how to sharpen and define empathy in the
context of judging.
Many scholars and commentators have discussed at length the confusion
over what empathy precisely means and how it is different from sympathy. 30
I propose a simple definition here: empathy is the exercise of our moral
imagination against, or at least indifferent to, our own self-interest.
Sympathy, by contrast, is the emotion we feel when others remind us of
ourselves or of situations we have ourselves experienced. In other words,
28. Robert Barnes, Justice John Paul Stevens Announces his Retirement from Supreme Court, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/09/AR20100409023
12.html.
29. Peter Baker, In Court Nominees, Is Obama Looking for Empathy by Another Name?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/us/politics/26memo.html. This is an odd statement;
surely it is often precisely the job ofjudges to"'endeavor to decide who ought to win.' "
30. See, e.g., Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, supra note 7, at 7-11; Susan A. Bandes,
Empathetic Judging and the Rule ofLaw, 2009 CARDozo L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 134, http://www.cardozolaw
review.com/content/denovo/BANDES_2009_133.pdf; Martha C. Nussbaum, Emotion in the Language of
Judging, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 23, 25 (1996).
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empathy is ego-alienating, whereas sympathy is ego-validating. Empathy
forces us to imagine and to have concern for those who are radically different
from, even threatening to, ourselves and our values. Sympathy allows us to
feel that we are the centers of our own worlds and that we can dole out pity
and compassion to those who remind us of ourselves and our values.
Sympathy is easy, as it involves little or no cognitive dissonance, whereas
empathy is hard, requiring at least a temporary embrace of cognitive
dissonance. 31
The primary virtue of empathy is that it tells us not to assume that we are
right, or objective, or impartial. It opens up a window of humility that can
help guide a decision-maker to the correct outcome. Empathy itself does not
dictate any outcome; 3 2 it simply insists that we subject our presumptions and
biases to facts and evidence and forces us to consider more interests than our
own.
There are limits to empathy, of course. It would be strange to demand
that judges attempt to empathize with every party in a given case, including
empathizing with murderers, rapists, wife beaters, and child abusers. It would
be stranger still to suggest that judicial empathy for any of these groups
should result in, say, lower sentences. My suggestion would be that judges
should incorporate Victoria Nourse's concept of "normative equality" with
regard to empathetic deliberations. 33  In the context of "passion" defenses,
Nourse proposes that the defense be retained
only in the limited set of cases in which the defendant and the victim stand on
an equal emotional and normative plane. When a man kills his wife's rapist, his
emotional judgments are inspired by a belief in a "wrong" that is no different
from the law's own: Ex ante, there is no doubt that rape is wrong both for the
defendant and the victim and that the defendant's "outrage" is "understandable"
from this perspective. When a man kills his departing wife, claiming that her
departure outraged him, this normative equality disappears. There is no reason
to suspect that the victim would have agreed to a regime in which "leaving" was
a wrong that the law would punish. 34
Similarly, I suggest that judges' empathetic resources should be reserved
only for those parties who stand in normative equality. For empathy to retain
a moral character, it cannot treat the voluntary actions of all individuals
equally, especially given that our law already makes many reasonable
distinctions regarding human behavior: those who kill, assault, cheat, and
31. Thus my definition of empathy is similar to Susan Bandes's definition of moral imagination:
Moral imagination is the ability to understand one's own limitations, the limitations of perspective,
the range of values at stake, and the possibilities for change inherent in the situation. It is the
ability to understand that things might be ordered differently, a way out of arid formalism and
closed systems.
Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, supra note 7, at 24.
32. See Susan Bandes's helpful distinction between "reasoning" and "reasons." Id. at 3.




abuse do not stand in the same place as those who do not, and there is no
morally intelligible reason why they should.35
Let us consider two Fourth Amendment cases, California v. Hodari D.36
and Illinois v. Wardlow,37 in the context of judicial empathy. In Hodari D.,
Justice Scalia muses on a question not actually before the Court: whether it
would be unreasonable for police to stop someone purely on the basis that the
person ran when they saw the officer.38 Justice Scalia thinks the answer is no,
basing this answer on the Bible: "See Proverbs 28:1 ('The wicked flee when
no man pursueth')." 39 In Wardlow, Chief Justice Rehnquist gets to address
the question directly, and decides that "[h]eadlong flight-wherever it
occurs-is the consummate act of evasion. . . ."4o When I teach this case to
my criminal procedure students, I ask them if there are any good reasons that
people might flee the police even if they are not involved in any wrongdoing.
Invariably, some students generate very compelling answers in the
affirmative, ranging from growing up in a neighborhood where being seen
with cops could put you or your loved ones at risk of retaliation by gangs, to
being a member of a class and race that increases your chances of
experiencing brutality by the police even if you've done nothing wrong.
Those who answer in the negative generally all say the same thing: "I
wouldn't run from police if I weren't doing anything wrong." It is a
fascinating failure of empathy that happens right before my eyes-even after
hearing compelling stories from peers who have grown up in very different
circumstances from theirs, some students will simply insist that the proper
way to decide the question is to imagine whether they themselves, with their
particular background and their experiences, would ever run from the police.
Their reaction is similar, that is, to that of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
The point here is not that the experience of one group trumps the
experience of another group. It is the refusal on the part of one group to
acknowledge that there are other reasonable and compelling experiences of
the world besides its own, or to even recognize that it treats the universal (that
is, the world of reasonable people) synonymously with the "I." That failure of
empathy leads, in this case, to an objectively unintelligible answer.
Answering the question, "Are there good reasons for someone to run from the
police even if he's done nothing wrong?" with "no, because I wouldn't"
should be an obvious non sequitur. The failure of logic here is, I suggest,
intimately connected to the failure of empathy. If a person over-identifies so
35. Assuming that there is no appreciable doubt about whether such crimes were committed.
36. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
37. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
38. See499 U.S. at 623 n.1.
39. Id.
40. 528 U.S. at 124.
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much with his own experiences that he assumes them to be universal, then he
not only cannot hear the experiences of others in any meaningful way, but he
also may be unable to hear the question actually being asked.
Or let us consider a different failure of empathy, Justice Kennedy's
seemingly "empathetic" consideration of women seeking late-term abortions
in Gonzales v. Carhart.4 1 Justice Kennedy would have us imagine how
traumatic the experience of undergoing an intact dilation and extraction
procedure would be for women, especially if they are not fully informed about
42the details of the procedure beforehand. Justice Kennedy does seem to be
making an attempt to imagine what it is like to be a woman in such
circumstances, but as many scholars have pointed out, it is an oddly selective
attempt.43 Justice Kennedy is moved by the possibility that some women may
be traumatized by the procedure, but apparently not by the plight of women
forced to undergo an unwanted birth. Less often discussed is how thoroughly
Justice Ginsburg deconstructs each one of Justice Kennedy's "empathetic"
points using empirical evidence and basic logic.44 For example, she queries
how the legitimate concern that women should receive accurate information
about a medical procedure is in any way addressed by prohibiting the medical
procedure, rather than, say, requiring the disclosure of such information.45 it
is as though Justice Kennedy has latched on to one vision of what a woman
facing an intact dilation and extraction procedure might feel and decided to
extrapolate from that the decisive answer to the question of whether the
procedure can be banned. Justice Kennedy could be said to have made at
least an attempt to expand his moral imagination by stepping into the shoes of
a woman facing a late-term abortion, but this attempt is undermined by his
attachment to one partial vision of this experience-likely the one he finds
most sympathetic. Justice Kennedy's failure to subject his empathetic effort
to critical evaluation demonstrates the shallowness of his imaginative attempt
and serves as a reminder that not all empathetic efforts are successful.
There is a final point. If empathy should mean, as I have proposed, the
general practice of looking beyond one's self-interest, subject to the limitation
of normative equality, then is it a fair criticism of President Obama and
Justice Sotomayor that they are wrong to suggest that people with certain
experiences or backgrounds are better at empathy than others? Does the
proper way for minorities to practice empathy involve standing in the shoes of
white, straight males? I would argue that there are two reasons why this is not
41. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
42. See id at 159-60.
43. See Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 30, at 145; Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and
Normality, EMORY L.J. 1136, 1136-37 (2010); Terry Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional
Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (2009); Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion
Restrictions under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1732-33 (2008).
44. See id at 171-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 172-74.
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the case. First, the current power structures in this country are still dominated
by white, straight males whose self-interested biases not only shape our laws
and institutions, but are coded as "natural" and "universal." The limits of the
judiciary's collective moral imagination are set by those interests and biases.
The judiciary as a whole would not be particularly well served by more of the
same, when the same is itself part of the problem. What minority judges, as
well as non-minority judges with strong capacities for empathy, may be able
to do is to contribute other interests and views to the judiciary's collective
moral imagination. None of these interests, of course, should by themselves
determine the outcome of any case, but they may provide for a fuller
deliberative experience. The second reason is that society as a whole, not
simply its structures, is dominated by its most privileged members. One
result of this is that those who are not similarly privileged have been
encouraged, if not forced, to constantly take those interests for their own, or in
preference for their own. That is to say, the people with relatively less
privilege in our society-racial minorities, women, gays, the poor-have by
virtue of their life experiences been forced into empathy all of their lives.
They have had to accommodate the interests and demands of those with
greater power and prestige in order to survive. They have often been at the
mercy of economic, educational, and cultural networks that do not value or in
some cases even recognize them. That is why, as unpopular a sentiment it
might be, it may well be possible that a "wise Latina" has a greater capacity
for empathy, and a larger moral imagination, than someone who has never
been forced to look beyond his own self-interest.
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